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ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA
I. INTRODUCTION
Aboriginal title, also known as original or Indian title, is a
particular form of property right inuring to native peoples by virtue
of their occupation of land from time immemorial.' Natives retain
aboriginal title solely because of their original and continuous
possession of the soil.
2
The purpose of this Note is to examine and discuss the
incidents of aboriginal possession as they exist in the United States
and Canada. This discussion will include an examination of the
essential elements in establishing a claim of aboriginal title.
This Note is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of
Canadian aboriginal title problems. Rather, this Note will
emphasize American precedents and problems. The Canadian
cases and issues will be discussed when they present approaches
that either add to the understanding of the existing American
position, or present a novel understanding or approach to
American case law.
II. NATURE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE IN THE UNITED
STATES
The theory of aboriginal rights is generally traced to Francisco
de Vitoria, 3 a sixteenth century Spanish theologian. Vitoria's
I. P. (,:M.,%N;s & N. Mj(:KKNIN r(H;. NA rivF. RIe;I Ns ( CANAI)A n.3 (2d cd. 1972).
2. Ann,,i., 41 A.IL.R. FF.o. 428, 428 n.2 (1979).
3. P. (;.MMIN(S & N. MI(:K NHER;, suPra ntet 1, at 14. Vitoria has Ieti ('alh (It( loiun(hr of'
modehirn irIternaional law. Cohen, Orri,'inal Indian Title, 32 M INN. L. RF;v. 28. 44 (1947). Vitoria
arguiiI ihat Indians werer. entileI io own properly even tIhouii gh they wt-re nol (hristians. Id. The
(rux ii othis ;trgurnricni is tl;t all pirsns are" C'IIihwiil with ('rtain hasi( rights. Id. lhese rights atta<'h
Iio persois not iiir(arse of raie, ('rtlted, or ( lr, , il r, i tir yI he < iiO nI their l ithu ir nir ity, Id.
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lectures, when coupled with the Papal Bull of 1537, 4 provided the
philosophical impetus for aboriginal rights as they exist in North
America. 5 The Papal Bull of 1537 declared that Indians had the
right to "freely and legitimately enjoy their liberty and possession
of their property. "6 Although not all the European nations
accepted the Papal Bull as the binding law on their possessions in
the New World, all the major colonial powers embraced the
philosophy enunciated by the Papal Bull.7
A. JOHNSON V. M'INTOSH
The first American statement on aboriginal land title arose in
Johnson v. M'Intosh.8 ChiefJustice Marshall delivered the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court that is regarded as the starting
point of any inquiry into aboriginal land title. 9 The case involved
the interpretation and construction of rights arising under deeds
executed on July 5, 1773, and October 18, 1775.10 The deeds,
issued by the Illinois tribe in favor of certain English subjects,
purported to convey a substantial amount of acreage in the area of
Fort Vincennes."t  In consideration for the 1775 deed the
purchasers paid the Illinois tribe approximately thirty-one
thousand dollars. 2  After the Declaration of Independence,
Virginia claimed the lands as the sovereign successor in interest to
King George III of England. 13 On December 20, 1783, Virginia
deeded Illinois County, which included these lands, to the United
States. 14 William M'Intosh, the defendant, took possession of the
lands under the authority of a patent issued by the United States. 15
The plaintiff, JoshuaJohnson, claimed the land as successor in
4. Bull Sublimis Deus (1537) (official statement of the Roman Catholic Church) reprinted in Cohen,
supra note 3, at 45.
5. Cohen, supra note 3, at 43-47. The commentator views the Bull Sublimis Deus, issued by Pope
Paul III in 1537, as an affirmation of the earlier lectures of Francisco de Vitoria. Id. at 45. The Papal
Bull of 1537 addressed all discovered peoples by stating, "Indians and all other people who may later
be discovered by Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their
property, even though they be outside the faith ofJesus Christ . Id.
6. Id.
7. P. CUMMINGS & N. MICKENBERG, supra note 1, at 14-18.
8. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).Johnson v. M'Intosh was the first important American case to
establish the nature of the sovereign's interest in aboriginal lands. Cohen, supra note 3, at 47.
9. See Calder v. Attorney General, 34 D.L.R.3d 145, 193 (Can. 1970) (Hall, J., dissenting).
Justice Hall stated thatJohnson v. M'Intosh is the locusclassicus of the principles of aboriginal title. Id.
10. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 550-58 (1823). The deeds under dispute in
M'Intosh covered lands situated northwest of the Ohio River, east of the Mississippi River, and west
of the Miami River. Id. at 551-52. The lands were situated within the colonial limits of Virginia. Id.
at 551.
11. Id. at 550-51.
12. Id. at 557.
13. Id. at 558.
14. Id. at 559-60.
15. Id. at 560. William M'Intosh purchased 11,560 acres of the land at issue from the United
States. Id. This sale was evidenced by a patent datedJuly 20, 1818. Id.
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interest to one of the purchasers under the 1775 deed and petitioned
the United States for recognition of the deed on various occasions
between 1781 and 1816.16 On each occasion the government
declined recognition. 17 Although the case may appear to be a
simple title status problem, Johnson v. M'Intosh hinged upon the
issue of whether individuals were competent to purchase lands held
by native bands through aboriginal title or whether such power was
solely the prerogative of the sovereign.18 The Court held that only
the sovereign is empowered to purchase aboriginal lands. 19
The M'Intosh decision is based upon the doctrine of
discovery. 20 The Court stated that, under the doctrine of discovery,
title vested in the European government whose subjects or agents
discovered the land. 21 The exclusion of all other European nations
gave the discovering nation the absolute right to acquire the lands
from the natives and to establish settlements on those lands.
22
Because of this right of acquisition, European governments
asserted the exclusive right of granting the soil to individuals.
23
These grants were in fee simple subject to an Indian right of
occupancy. 24 Under the discovery doctrine the British government
asserted an absolute legal title to all lands occupied by Indians in
the United States, which title vested in the United States as the
successor to King George 111.25
Under the doctrine of discovery the sovereign asserted full
legal title to Indian lands while the aborigines held a cognizable
equitable interest. 26 In M'Intosh the Court recognized that this
interest was one of mere occupancy, which arose out of
possession. 27 This equitable interest in occupancy was incompatible
16. Id. at 561-62.
17. Id. Nothing is noted in the facts of M'Intosh to indicate why the Congress of the United States
refused to recognize the original deeds of 1773 and 1775.
18. Id. at 572. ChiefJustice Marshall viewed the inquiry as being "confined to the power of the
Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the Courts of
this country." Id.
19. Id. at 604. Discussing the reasoning behind the result in M'Intosh, ChiefJustice Marshall
declared that, concerning the authority of the sovereign, there was no difference between vacant
lands and Indian lands. Id. at 596.
20. See id. at 572-88. (Court's discussion of the application of the doctrine of discovery).
21. Id. at 573. The Court noted that title by discovery was good against all governments and
could be perfected by taking possession, Id.
22. Id. Apparently, from the context of the opinion in M'Intosh the foundation of exclusivity was
the principle that fee title to discovered lands vested in the sovereign.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 574. The Indians retained the right to possess their aboriginal homelands; the act of
discovery, however, substantially impaired the tribe's right to exercise complete and independent
sovereignty as a nation. Thus, the act of discovery had the effect of relegating the Indian tribe to the
status ofa dependent domestic nation. SeeCherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)
(Indian tribes are dependent domestic nations and not foreign nations).
25. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587. In M'Intoshi'the United States asserted that it had full
legal title to the land. Id.
26. Id. at 588.
27. Id. at 591.
NOTE
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with the notion of transferring absolute title to others.28
The Court also declared that because the United States
occupied the position held by the British Crown prior to 1776, the
legal effect of the Royal Proclamation of 176329 could not be
avoided. 30 Thus, the deeds were void under the clause that forbade
all British subjects from making any purchase or settlement, or
taking possession of reserved lands. 31 The essence of the M'Intosh
holding is that because the Indians did not use the land as
Europeans did, full legal title vested in the discovering nation.
3 2
Only the discovering nation or its successor had the absolute right
to extinguish aboriginal title and to grant the land.
33
B. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY
The next major statement on aboriginal land title occurred in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.34 In Cherokee Nation the United States
Supreme Court held that Indian tribes were not foreign states as
contemplated by the Constitution of the United States; rather,
Indian tribes were dependent domestic nations.3 Because of the
tribe's dependent status, the Court stated that the relationship
between the Indian tribes and the federal government was one of
ward and guardian. 36 The Court deemed the Indian right of
occupancy to their lands to be "as sacred as the fee simple, absolute
28. Id. ChiefJustice Marshall acknowledged that the incapacity of Indians to transfer fee title
might be opposed both to "natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations ..... " He reasoned,
however, that this incident of aboriginal title was "adopted to the actual condition of the two people"
and that it might "be supported by reason." Id. at 591-92.
29. See infra note 188 for the text of the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
30. 21 U.S. at 597. Justice Marshall stated that the authority of the Royal Proclamation of 1763,
in respect to the North American continent, was not open to question and that its impact was capable
of recognition in American courts. Id.
The Court also discussed an English case, Campbell v. Hall, which struck down part of the
proclamation as unconstitutional. Since the issue in Campbelldealt with the Crown's ability to impose
certain taxes on conquered provinces, the Court determined that the case did not affect the
provisions dealing with North America. Id. See Campbell v. Hall, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (K.B. 1774).
31. Id. at 594. The reserved lands included all lands acquired after the Seven Years War that
were not included in Quebec, East Florida or West Florida and were not covered by the Hudson's
Bay Company Charter of 1670. Royal Proclamation of 1763, CAN. REV. STAT. app. 1 at 127 (1970).
32. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 5
8 6
. Hunting and fishing were not exclusive uses sufficient
to establish full legal title under the common law. Id. at 569-70.
33. Id. at 587.
34. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
35. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). The Court in Cherokee Nation
determined that Indian tribes were dependent domestic nations because the United States asserted a
title independent of Indian consent and because the various tribes looked to the United States for
protection from European sovereigns. Id. at 1-2. The basis for their dependent status was that the
Indians were in a "state ofpupilage" much resembling "that of a ward to his guardian." Id. at 1.
36. Id. SeeJones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899), In Jones the Court stated that as tribal power
diminishes the natives become more dependent upon the United States. Id. at lO.Jones dealt with the
question of an individual Indian's ability to alienate lands granted specifically to him pursuant to a
treaty. Id. at 8.
As tribal power diminishes, the tribe becomes unable to protect itself from unconscionable
conduct on the part of better educated and more sophisticated individuals. See id. 10-13. In fulfilling
its duty as guardian the United States must maintain the highest level of fair dealing. Id.
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title of the whites. ''"7
Even though the courts have held this right of occupancy to be
sacred, it must be emphasized that Indian title is different from the
fee title. 38 Aboriginal title is, at best, only a right of Indians to
occupy and use native lands. 39 The tribal right of occupancy is,
however, an important interest that is as sacred as the United
States' right to the fee simple title.
40
C. ATTRIBUTES OF ABORIGINAL POSSESSKON
The possessory interest of aboriginal title is held by the tribal
community rather than by individuals. 41 For aboriginal title to
remain intact the land must be used in accordance with tribal laws
and customs. 4 2 Thus, the individual's right to use the land can only
arise within the purview of tribal law and custom.4 3 This tribal
right is communal since there is no known instance of individual
ownership of tribal lands.
44
Because of the communal nature of tribal possession,
individuals have no interest that can pass to their descendents who
are no longer members of the tribal group. 45 One of the clearest
statements of an individual's right was expressed in Journeycake v.
Cherokee Nation,4 6  in which the Court of Claims stated that
aboriginal title lands are a form of community property. 47 Because
37. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. at 48.
38. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941).
39. Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1947).
40. United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 593 (1873). The Court in Cook described the
right to use and occupy aboriginal lands as "unlimited." Id. at 593. The case states, however, that it
is possible for an Indian tribe to be held liable for bad faith waste. Id.
41. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 139, 147 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
Aboriginal title is vested in the tribe. Thus, an individual may assert a right to use the land only if
that use is within the purview of the customs of the tribe. Id.
42. Sac & Fox Tribe ot inchan v. United States, 383 F.2d 991, 997 (Ct. Cl. 1967). In Sac &
Fox Tribe the United States Court of Claims stated that aboriginal title lands "must be used within
the tribe and subject to its laws and customs." Id.
43. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. United States, 165 F. Supp. at 147 (individual's
right to use aboriginal lands depends on tribal laws and customs).
44. Id.
45. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 906, 913 (Ct. Cl. 1963). In Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe the question of whether individual descendants of a former tribal entity had any
interest in aboriginal lands arose because of an Indian Claims Commission Order that declared that
"the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe 'is entitled to maintain this action in a representative capacity on
behalf of all the descendants of the Mississiooi bands of Chippewas and the Pillager and the Lake
Winnibigoshish bands of .hippewas'. (emphasis in original). ta. The Court of Claims stated
that the term "descendants" should be deleted because it implied that the descendants had a right
which they did not in fact possess. Id.
46. 28 Ct. Cl. 281 (1893), aff'd, 155 U.S. 196 (1894).
47. Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation, 28 Ct. Cl. 281, 302 (1893), aff'd, 155 U.S. 196 (1894). In
.Journeycake the Court ofClaims described the communal nature of aboriginal title lands by stating:
The distinctive characteristic of communal property is that every member of the
community is an owner of it as such. He does not take as heir, or purchaser, or
grantee; if he dies his right of property does not descend; if he removes from the
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removal from the tribal community causes an individual's right to
expire, a loss of membership in the tribe results in a loss of any right
to participate in the proceeds of any later sale or distribution of
tribal property. 48  A loss of membership occurs through absence
from the tribe.
4 9
Another early decision, Worcester v. Georgia,50  raised the
question of a state's ability to exercise sovereignty over Indian
lands. 51 In Worcester a white missionary challenged his conviction
for violating a Georgia statute that required non-Indians to obtain
a license prior to entering aboriginal lands. 52 The United States
Supreme Court determined that only the federal government was
empowered to exercise sovereignty over Indian lands. 53  The
determinative factor was that the federal constitution granted
exclusive control over Indian affairs to the federal government.
54
The Court found that, because the missionary entered the lands
with the permission of the United States, the statute was repugnant
to the Supremacy Clause and the laws of the United States. 55 The
Court stated that Indian lands were separate from the state where
the lands were situated, that the Indians possessed certain rights
with which no state could interfere, and that the power of
regulating intercourse with Indian tribes was vested in the United
States. 56 The Court determined that it was the policy of the United
States to recognize Indians as "distinct political communities" that
could exercise exclusive authority within the boundaries of the
reservation. 57 Furthermore, this authority was "guarantied [sic] by
the United States. "58 Worcester v. Georgia was the first case to declare
community it expires; if he wishes to dispose of it he has nothing which he can convey;
and yet he has a right of property in the land as perfect as that of any person; and his
children after him will enjoy all that he enjoyed, not as heirs but as communal owners.
28 Ct. CI. at 302.
48. Id.
49. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 139, 148 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
In Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians the issue of tribal membership arose when the Eastern Band of
Potawatomi intervened in a suit seeking a share of any judgment or award that might be awarded to
the Western Band of Potowatomi. Id. at 141-42. Justice Reed, sitting by designation, stated that
because the Eastern Band had separated from the Western Band, they were not entitled to
membership in the tribe for purposes of any award for lands that had last been held by the Western
Band. Id. at 148.
50.31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
51. Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542 (1832).
52. Id. at 523. In Worcester a state statute provided that no white man could enter lands held by
the Cherokee Nation unless the governor granted him a license to do so and he agreed to take an oath
to uphold the laws and Constitution of Georgia. Id.
'3. Id. at jbl.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 561-62. In Worcester the plaintiff, entered Cherokee territory under the authority of the
President. Id. at 529.
56. Id. at 561.








The case law indicates that the essence of aboriginal title is that
it is a tribal right of occupancy and possession while full legal title is
vested in the sovereign. 60 This possessory interest is sacred and
neither states nor private individuals may interfere with Indian
possession without the consent of the federal government. 61 The
aboriginal interest is communal62 and inalienable to anyone except
the sovereign.
6 3
III. ESTABLISHING ABORIGINAL TITLE
A. OCCUPANCY REQUIREMENT
Aboriginal title is established by showing actual, exclusive,
and continuous use and occupancy of the land for an extended
period prior to loss of possession. 64 In United States v. Santa Fe Pacific
Railroad65 the United States Supreme Court required the Walapais
Tribe to show that the lands were the ancestral home of the tribe.
66
The Santa Fe Court said a mere showing that the tribe asserting title
had wandered on the lands with other tribes was insufficient. 67 To
assert aboriginal title, the tribe must show that neither the United
States nor its predecessors have taken affirmative steps to
extinguish aboriginal title.
68
59. Cohen, supra note 3, at 49.
60. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 591.
61. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. at 48.
62. Prairie Band ofPotawatomi Indians v. United States, 165 F. Supp. at 147.
63. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 584-85.
64. Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 383 F.2d 991. 998 (Ct. Cl. 1967);
Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184. 194 (1966)
(occupancy requirement used to determine the legitimacy ot Ihdian claims fo- compensation arising
fromn the unauthorized taking of aboriginal title hinds).
65. 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
66. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339. 345 (1941). In Santa Fe the United
States brought an action as guardians for the Walapais tribe of Northwestern Arizona. Id. at 343.
The government sought to keep a railroad company front interfering with tribal possession. Id. The
Court defined ancestral home as "definable territory occupied exclusively by the [tribe]." Id. at 345.
67. Id. But (£ Hamlet ofBaker Lake v. Ninister oflndian Affairs & N. Dev., 107 D.L.R.3d 513
(Fed. Ct. Trial Div. Can. 1979). The court in Baker Lake recognized that certain nomadic bands of
Inuit and Eskimos generally wandered vast areas of land in the Arctic tundra. Id. at 544. This
Canadian court deemed this to be sufficient to establish aboriginal title because harsh environmental
conditions necessitated such a lifestyle. Id. Arguably, a similar result could be appropriate when
discussing certain desert tribes.
68. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941). The issue of extinguishment
of aboriginal title by a predecessor government arose because the lands were part of the Mexican
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To establish Indian title the tribe must show that it actually
used and occupied the lands in question. 69 A signed treaty ceding
the lands to the United States is evidence of use and occupancy, but
it is insufficient to establish aboriginal title.70 Courts have taken the
view that use and occupancy cannot be viewed in a vacuum. 71
Instead, use and occupancy must be established in accordance with
the normal lifestyles, habits, customs, and usages of the occupying
Indians. 72 Because aboriginal title is established by the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the occupying tribe's lifestyle,
original title lands may include both permanent villages and
seasonal or hunting grounds. 73  Because of the semi-nomadic
lifestyles of many tribes, Indian hunting grounds may be in
possession similar to the cleared fields of whites .74 Since occupancy
is based on the circumstances surrounding a tribe's normal way of
life, courts view the issue of occupancy and use as a question of
fact. 7
5
B. JOINT ABORIGINAL TITLE
Although the use and occupancy required to establish
aboriginal possession must be exclusive, courts have recognized
aboriginal title in two or more tribes in which the land is held in
cession. Id. at 345-47. The possibility that either the Spanish Crown or the Mexican government
extinguished aboriginal title had a direct impact on the status of the title held by the United States.
Id.
69. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 194
(1966).
70. Red Lake Band v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 389, 393-94(1964). The lands in RedLake were
ceded to the United States by the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians. The Court of Claims allowed the
Chippewa bands to introduce evidence that they, and not the Wahpeton or Sisseton Indians, actually
exercised dominion over the lands. Id. See Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v.
United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 194 (1966). In Confederated Tribes the Court of Claims stated that the
inclusion of lands in an area ceded by treaty was not sufficient evidence to establish that the tribe held
the lands by aboriginal title. Id. This policy recognizes that the government at various times adopted
the position that it was easier to enter into treaties with Indian tribes than fight with them. Red Lake,
164 Ct. Cl. at 393-94. The court in Red Lake stated that the government often negotiated settlements
with Indian tribes even though the tribes had no cognizable interest in the lands with the hope that
open hostilities could be avoided. Id.
71. See Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 383 F.2d 991, 998 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Indian
occupation is determined by tribe's normal way of life.
72. Id.
73. Spokane Tribe of Indians v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 58, 66 (1966). In Spokane Tribe the
Court of Claims overturned a decision of that Indian Claims Commission that established the
territorial boundaries of aboriginal lands because the Commission relied too heavily on testimony of
an expert witness. Id. at 65-66. Evidence taken from historical sources indicated that the expert had
failed to include seasonal hunting grounds as part of the tribes aboriginal territory. Id. at 66. See
United States v. Seminole Indians of Florida, 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 385 (1967) (aboriginal title not
dependent upon complete occupation of lands). In Seminole Indians the Court of Claims recognized
that the Seminoles held aboriginal title to the entire state of Florida even though they only
occasionally hunted in the more remote areas of the state. Id.
74. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
75. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941). In Santa Fe the Supreme
Court stated that the question of the existence of aboriginal title presented an ordinary issue of fact.
Id.
114
joint and amicable possession. 76 A complete merger of the tribes
claiming joint aboriginal possession is not a prerequisite for joint
aboriginal title if the facts indicate that there was joint and amicable
possession.77
In United States v. Seminole Indians of Florida78 the Seminoles,
who are not a unified racial entity, claimed joint aboriginal title to
the entire state of Florida. 7 9 The United States contended that the
Seminoles were not in joint possession of Florida.80 Instead, the
government argued that the Seminoles had assimilated the other
Florida tribes by conquest, alliances, and occupation of lands left
vacant when disease decimated the original native populations. 8'
The Court of Claims held that the acquisition of rights from
conquered or assimilated tribes did not destroy the aboriginal rights
of the assimilated groups; rather, the rights were recognized as
adhering to the emergent culture. 
8 2
When two or more tribes did not consider themselves as a
single or closely integrated entity, but rather, as separate
politicially allied groups, courts are unwilling to find joint
aboriginal title existed. 83 These courts have concluded that there
was political and cultural separateness sufficient to support a
finding of no joint possession. 84 The mere fact that two closely
related tribes occupied the same land will not support a finding of
joint aboriginal possession when the tribes were on unfriendly
terms.85 Thus, for example, the sale of members of the opposing
tribe into slavery for entering lands in dispute between them will
defeat joint aboriginal title. 
86
76. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 194
n.6 (1966). Joint aboriginal possession is a question of fact that is not viewed in a vacuum, but must
arise from the totality of circumstances. Id.
77. United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1395 (Ct. Cl. 1975). In San
Ildefonso the Court of Claims rejected a finding of the Indian Claims Commission that joint
aboriginal title did not exist because the two pueblos each asserted exclusive title to separate outlying
areas. Id. The court found that joint aboriginal title existed in the lands located between the two
pueblos. Id. The question arose when the United States contended that joint aboriginal title did not
exist because the two pueblos never merged. Id. The court rejected the argument that it was
necessary to show that the two pueblos had become a single land-owning entity. fd.
78. 180 Ct. Cl. 375 (1967).
79. United States v. Seminole Indians of Florida, 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 377 (1967).
80. Id. at 386.
81. Id. The Court ofClaims in Seminole Indians concluded that the former inhabitants of acquired
lands were not entirely decimated, but were survivors that were assimilated into Seminole society.
Id. Assimilation destroyed the identity of the tribes assimilated but it did not destroy the assimilated
group's possessory interests. Id.
82. Id.
83. See IowaTribe of Iowa Reservation v. United States, 195 Ct. Cl. 365, 370 (1971).
84. See id. The Court of Claims in Iowa Tribe noted that the issue ofjoint aboriginal possession is
one of fact that will hinge on joint exclusivity. Id. A showing that a number of closely allied tribes
wandered the same area is insufficient. Id.
85. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 198
(1966).
86. Id. The historical evidence in Confederated Tribes indicated that the Wayampam and Snake
tribes were not on the best of terms. Id. The record indicated that the Wayampam considered the
19841 NOTE
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C. TIME REQUIREMENT
The time requirement for establishing aboriginal title cannot
generally be fixed at a certain number of years. 87 The duration of
occupation must be sufficient, however, to allow the Indians to
transform the area into domestic territory prior to their loss of
possession.8 8 Thus, aboriginal title will not attach to territory
conquered shortly before the loss of possession.8 9 Because the lands
in question must be domestic territory, the status of aboriginal
territory is not accorded to tribes at the very moment they first
dominate a geographic area. Instead, the rights of aboriginal
possession take time to vest. The courts, therefore, will not create
aboriginal title in a tribe that played the conqueror a few years
earlier. 90 Although there is no minimum number of years sufficient
to establish aboriginal title, one court has held that fifty years is, as
a matter of law, "a long time." 91
D. TRIBAL ENTITY REQUIREMENT
The decisions indicate that because of the communal nature of
aboriginal title, only an Indian tribe or band of Indians may
establish aboriginal title. 92 A related problem is determining what
constitutes an Indian. 93 Courts have defined an Indian, for the
purpose of establishing aboriginal title, as a person meeting two
qualifications: First, his ancestors must have lived in America
before its discovery by the white race; second, the individual must
be considered an "Indian" by the community in which he lives. 94
Snakes to be savages. Id. Because of this attitude the Wayampam occasionally imprisoned Snake
women and children found in disputed territory. Id. These prisoners were then sold into slavery by
the Wayampam at markets located on the Columbia River. Id.
87. Id. at 194.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Sac & Fox Tribe v. United States. 315 F.2d 896, 905, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963).
The facts of Sac & Fox indicated that the Sac and Fox had been in conflict with the Illinois Tribe
over the lands in question as late as the end of the eighteenth century. Id. Thus, when the United
States exercised complete dominion over the territory in 1804 aboriginal title had not attached to the
Sac and Fox because they had not been in possession for a sufficient period of time. Id.
91. United States v. Seminole Indians, 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 387 (1967). In Seminole Indians the Court
of Claims found that the Seminoles had occuppied lands in Florida for a period of 50 years before
they lost possession. Id.
92. See Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 U.S. 288, 308 (1886). In Cherokee Trust Funds the Court held
that when a group of Cherokee Indians remained in North Carolina while the bulk of the nation went
west of the Mississippi, the former tribal members that remained behind were no longer part of the
Cherokee Nation. Id. at 310-11. See also Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. United States, 165 F.
Supp. 139, 147 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
93. See Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa v. United States, 490 F.2d 935 (Ct. Cl. 1974). The
Court of Claims in Turtle Mountain found that a substantial portion of the Chippewa Indians that
settled in the Turtle Mountains were mixed bloods. Id. at 942. Many of them were of Canadian
ancestry. Id. at 944. The court determined that neither of these factors could defeat a claim of
aboriginal title. Id. at 942-44.
94. Id. at 942-43. The mixed bloods in Turtle Mountain were treated by the Chippewa as being
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Thus, the presence of a substantial number of mixed bloods cannot
defeat a claim of aboriginal title when the mixed bloods lived
among the Indians, held themselves out as members of the Indian
community, and were accepted by the Indian community as
Indians. 95
There is no requirement that the Indians establish the
existence of aboriginal title prior to the first American exercise of
sovereign title since sovereign title and aboriginal title are
concurrent. 96 Consequently, either form of title may be destroyed,
created, or transferred independently of the other. 97 To contend
that aboriginal title may not arise after the attachment of American
sovereignty is to ignore the distinction between aboriginal and
sovereign title. 98 The Court of Claims has stated that Indian title
may be established at any time prior to the date the Indians lose the
land. 99
IV. EXTINGUISHING ABORIGINAL TITLE
A. EXTINGUISHMENT GENERALLY
The scope of Congressional power to extinguish aboriginal
title was expressed in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks.1 0 In
Alcea Band of Tillamooks ChiefJustice Vinson stated:
As against any but the sovereign, original Indian title was
accorded the protection of complete ownership; but it was
vulnerable to affirmative action by the sovereign, who
possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of
occupancy at will. Termination of the right by the
sovereign action was complete and left the land free and
clear of Indian claims. 101
In 1867 the United States Supreme Court stated that the
part of the Indian community. Id. at 943. The mixed and full bloods often hunted, trapped, and
traded together. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 941-42. The court in Turtle Mountain rejected a claim that the Turtle Mountain
Chippewa could not assert aboriginal title because they entered North Dakota at approximately the
same time as the Louisiana Purchase. Id. at 941.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 383 F.2d 991, 999 (1968). The court in Sac
& Fox ruled that the cutoff date for establishing aboriginal title was not the date of the Louisiana
Purchase; rather, the date was the day the Sac and Fox tribe surrendered possession of the lands
under the 1824 treaty. Id.
100. 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
101. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40. 46 (1946). The Court in
Tillamooks addressed a congressional ratification of a federal taking of aboriginal lands. Id. at 43-44.
See, infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Tillamooks' taking issue.
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Indian right of occupancy created an "indefeasible title" to the
lands passing from generation to generation. 0 2 This title continued
to abide with the tribe until either "dissolution of the tribe" or
purchase by a "party possessed of the right of preemption." 103 The
language concerning the right of preemption is somewhat
misleading'0 4 since the Indian right of occupancy can only be
disturbed by the United States with the permission of Congress.0 5
The right to extinguish aboriginal title rests exclusively with
Congress irrespective of who owns the fee simple title. 106
Congress may extinguish aboriginal title by treaty,
abandonment, purchase, force, or the exercise of complete
dominion over the lands in a manner inconsistent with aboriginal
possession. 10 7 The time, manner, and method of congressional
action to extinguish aboriginal title and occupancy are
nonjusticiable political questions because they are exercises of the
sovereign power of the United States. 0 8  Only a clear and
unambiguous governmental action can deprive Indians of
aboriginal title. 0 9 It would violate the ward-guardian relationship
between the Indians and the United States to imply extinguishment
when such a conclusion is not plainly warranted. 10 Since Indian
tribes are dependent domestic nations that must rely upon the good
faith and protection of the federal government, expressions that do
not clearly indicate an extinguishment should be resolved in favor
of the tribe rather than the United States."' Thus, unless the
conclusion of extinguishment is plain, aboriginal title will continue.
102. The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 771 (1867).
103. Id.
104. The Court's use of the word "preemption" in New York Indians is misleading because the
term is used in an unusual sense. See id- In the United States preemption is usually understood to
mean that "privilege accorded by the government to the actual settler upon a certainlimited portion
of the public domain, to purchase such tract at a fixed price to the exclusion of all other applicants."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (5th ed. 1979).
105. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S, 339, 345 (1941). The Court in Santa Fe
clearly indicated that only Congress may authorize an interference with aboriginal possession. Id. at
347.
106. F. COHEN. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 489 (1982 ed.).
107. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 346.
110. Id. at 354. See Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877) (third parties are never able to
challenge justness of the method of extinguishment). Beecher leaves open the possibility ofan Indian
tribe challenging the method of extinguishment on the grounds that the method chosen violates the
guardian-ward relationship between the federal government and the tribe. Id.
In United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. the Court stated it would be a breach of the fiduciary
relationship to lightly imply extinguishment. 314 U.S. at 354.
111. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912). When dealing with agreements between
Indian tribes and the government the Court stated, "The construction, instead of being strict, is
liberal: doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favor of the United States, are to be
resolved in favor of a weak- and defenseless people, who are wards of the nation, and dependent
wholly upon its protection and good faith." Id-
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B. ALASKAN NATIVE CLAIMS
The question of extinguishment of aboriginal title has been an
important issue recently in Alaska. In Edwardsen v. Morton"
12
certain groups of Arctic Indian tribes that occupied Alaska's North
Slope brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior. 113 The
plaintiff's claim alleged that the Department of the Interior
facilitated unlawful transfers of land to Alaska in violation of the
Indians' rights. 1" 4 The Indians viewed the transfers of land as
authorizations of third-party trespass on aboriginal land. "15
Alaska claimed the acreage in question under the Alaska
Statehood Act, 1 6 which allowed the State to claim full title to more
than one hundred million acres of vacant, unappropriated, and
unreserved lands. 17 The plaintiffs partially based their claim on
The Organic Act of May 17, 1884.118 The Act recognized the
natives' right to continue in possession of aboriginal lands until,
such time as Congress acted to extinguish Indian title and organize
reservations." 19 The Indians contended that an act of recognition
was not necessary for aboriginal title to exist; but if the court
required recognition, both the Organic Act and the Statehood Act
recognized aboriginal title.120 The plaintiffs argued that lands held
under aboriginal title could not be vacant, unappropriated, and
unreserved as the Alaska Statehood Act required.' 21 Thus, any
entry upon the lands under color of the Alaska Statehood Act
constituted a trespass to the Indian rights. 1
22
The court recognized that only Congress could extinguish
aboriginal title and any entry by another party constituted a
trespass.123 The trespassors could not claim protection by asserting
that they took possession of the land with the permission of officers
112. 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973).
113. Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D.D.C. 1973).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) as amended Pub. L. No. 86-
70, 73 Stat. 141 (1959).
117. 72 Stat. at 340. Section 6(b) of the Alaska Statehood Act provides that the state could claim
full title to 102,550,UU0 acres of vacant. unappropriatect, and unreserved lands "[p]rovided Itjhat
nothing herein contained shall affect any valid existing claim .... " Id. (emphasis in original).
118. Edwardsen v. Morton. 369 F.Supp. at 1363 n.3. Section 8 of the Organic Act of May 17,
1884 provided that "the Indians . . . shall not be disturbed tn the possession of any lands actually in
their use or occupation or now claimed by them but the terms under which such persons may acquire
title to such land is reserved... [to] Congress." The Organic Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat.
24, 26(1884).
119. Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. at 1363. The record indicated that Congress
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to organize townsites and reservations for the Alaskan
natives. Id. Few such townsites or reservations were ever established. Id. The historical evidence
indicated that the Alaskan natives were generally ignored prior to statehood. Id.
120. Id. at 1365-66.
121. Id. at 1373-74.
122. Id. at 1371, 1373.
123. Id. at 1371.
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of the United States because those officers lacked the necessary
statutory authority. 124 The court examined the Alaska Statehood
Act and concluded that Congress did not intend to enlarge or
diminish the existing possessory rights vested in the aboriginal
groups. 125  After examining these facts the court held that
aboriginal lands could not fall within the scope of "vacant,
unappropriated, or unreserved lands."
126
Congress had attempted to resolve the problem by passing the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.127 The Act
purported to extinguish aboriginal title in Alaska and provided
substantial compensation for the lost property rights. 1
2 8
In United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 129 the Alaskan natives
claimed that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act could not
defeat claims that arose prior to its passage. 130 The trial court held
.that because Congress could terminate aboriginal possession at will
without compensation, it followed that Congress had the authority
to terminate a claim of past interference with aboriginal
possession. 13 1 The trial court concluded that it was an essential
power of Congress to extinguish aboriginal title without
constitutional restrictions so that Indian land claims and disputes
could be conclusively and finally settled. 132 On appeal the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the conclusions of the
district court and held that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act extinguished past claims based on aboriginal title. 1
33
C. SUMMARY
Courts have recognized that Congress has the plenary power
124. Id. at 1375. The court in Edwardsen also stated that the public official who personally
allowed the third party trespass could be liable for breaching his duty to protect aboriginal lands from
intrusion by third parties. Id. at 1381 & n. 48.
125. Id. at 1373. The court in Edwardsen based its finding of congressional intent on 5 4 of the
Alaska Statehood Act, which provided that Alaska would "disclaim any right or title" to lands held
by either the natives or the United States in trust for the tribal groups. 72 Stat. 339 (1958) as amended
73 Stat. 141 (1959).
126. Edwardsen, 369 F. Supp. at 1374.
127. 43 U.S.C. § 1601-28 (1976).
128. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 5§ 1603, 1605 (1976). Section 1603
extinguished aboriginal title in Alaska. Id. S 1603 (1976). Section 1605 provided for the
establishment of an Alaskan Native Fund and further provided that $462,500,000 be deposited in the
fund. Id. § 1605 (1976).
129. 435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977), aff'd, 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
888 (1980).
130. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F..Supp. 1009, 1013-14 (D. Alaska 1977),
aff'd, 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir.)cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980). In Atlantic Richfield the United States
brought the suit on behalf of the Alaskan natives. 435 F. Supp. at 1013. The suit sought to force
Alaska and third party trespassers to compensate various native groups for harm incurred by
trespassers under color ofthe Alaska Statehood Act. 435 F.Supp. at 1014 n.2.
131.-Id. at 1030-31.
132. Id. at 1031. The court in Atlantic Richfield indicated that public policy necessitated that
Congress have the power to conclusively extinguish aboriginal title and land claims arising from
aboriginal title. Id.
133. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 612 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1980).
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to extinguish aboriginal possessory rights. 134 Because aboriginal
title is based on continuous possession, an abandonment will
extinguish aboriginal title. When there is an abandonment, the
right to possession will immediately attach to the fee. 13 5 Courts
have also recognized extinguishment by military force since the use
of force is an almost unassailable indication of the sovereign's
intent to revoke aboriginal title. 1
36
Since Congress holds the sovereign's power to extinguish
aboriginal title, neither an executive order nor an encroachment by
white settlers under the auspices of an executive agency will
constitute an extinguishment of aboriginal title. 13 7  Case law
supports the proposition that the mere creation of an Indian
reservation is not conclusive evidence that aboriginal title in
outlying lands is extinguished. 138  Indian settlement on a
reservation extinguishes aboriginal title in outlying lands only
when the specific circumstances surrounding the transaction
warrant a conclusion that Congress intended to extinguish
aboriginal title.139  Similarly, courts have closely examined
voluntary cessions of lands by natives in exchange for the
establishment of a reservation to determine whether the Indians
134. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1031 (D.Alaska 1977). The
result in Atlantic Richfield had the effect of allowing Congress to extinguish aboriginal title to all lands
transferred to the State of Alaska pursuant to the Alaska Statehood Act. Id.
135. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 526 (1877). In Beecherthe plaintiff claimed certain lands
formerly held by Menomonees. Id. at 525. The plaintiff based his claim on a patent issued by the
United States. Id. at 522. The defendant entered the property by state grant. Id. The defendant
prevailed because the lands had been transferred to the state. Id. at 526. When the federal
government passed title to the state, it took subject to the Indian right of possession. Id. When the
lands were abandoned by the Indians the state gained perfect title to the land. Id.
136. See United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 982
(1976). In Gemmill three members of the Pit River Indian Tribe were convicted of illegally taking
trees from a national forest. 535 F.2d at 1147. The Indians claimed a right to the timber under
aboriginal title. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that aboriginal title had been
extinguished. Id. at 1148. This extinguishment was based on the United States' taking possession of
the territory in question after decisively defeating the Pit River Indians at the Battle of the Infernal
Caverns. Id.
137. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 945-47 (Ct.
Cl. 1974). The executive branch does not ordinarily have the power to eliminate aboriginal title.
Congress, however, may delegate this power. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339,
350-51 (1941). In Santa Fe Pac. R.R. the Court described a statute as setting up "machinery for
extinguishment of claims." Id. at 350. Once the "machinery" is put in place, the method chosen by
Congress to extinguish the claim becomes a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 350-51.
138. United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1388 (Ct. Cl. 1975). See Gila
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 494 F.2d 1386, 1390 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 295 (1974). In deciding that the creation of a reservation did not extinguish
aboriginal title, the Court of Claims examined the history of the Pima-Maricopa community. 494
F.2d at 1387-91. The facts indicated that between 1876 and 1915 the government enlarged the
reservation seven times and created one additional reservation to prevent encroachment onto
aboriginal lands. Id. at 1388, 1390. This case indicates that a tribe may hold reservation lands and
will still be able to claim outlying lands by aboriginal title. Id. at 1391.
139. United States v. Pueblo ofSan Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1388 (Ct. Cl. 1975). The question
of intent to extinguish aboriginal title is determined by a close examination of all the circumstances
surrounding the congressional action. Id. See also United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S.
339, 357-58 (1941) (creation of reservation at request of tribe extinguishes aboriginal title when
circumstances indicate intent to abandon).
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intended the cession to be a settlement for the renunciation of their
aboriginal title. 140 Certain acts performed under the auspices of
Congress that are anticipatory of future white settlement are
insufficient to extinguish aboriginal rights unless there is a clear
indication of congressional intent to extinguish aboriginal
possession. 141
In summary, whenever Congress has acted in a manner that
manifests an intent to extinguish aboriginal land claims, aboriginal
title ceases to exist. If Congressional intent to extinguish aboriginal
title cannot be proven, the courts must infer that native title
remains vested in the tribal group.
14 2
V. COMPENSATION FOR ABORIGINAL LANDS
In an area of law prone to produce difficult and diverse
opinions, perhaps no issue raises more confusion than the issue of
compensation. The early opinions contain some glowing
descriptions of the conduct of Indian affairs. This picture is not
always historically accurate. This type of depiction is demonstrated
by Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,'43 in
which the Court stated that it was difficult to comprehend the
proposition that the doctrine of discovery gave the discovering
nation rights in the newly discovered territory that mitigated the
preexisting rights of aboriginal peoples. 144 Instead, the Supreme
Court determined that discovery gave the discovering nation the
exclusive right to purchase the lands from its native inhabitants.
145
In theory the sovereign purchased the lands and did not coerce
140.Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 947 (Ct. Cl.
1974). In Turtle Mountain the tribe requested that a reservation be established. Id. This did not
constitute an abandonment because there was no showing that the tribe accepted the reservation as a
claim settlement. Id.
141. See United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (acts
committed in anticipation of future white settlement, such as surveying, do not affect Indian title);
Plamondon v. United States, 467 F.2d 935, 937-38 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (surveying and some actual white
settlement on tribal lands are insufficient to establish extinguishment of aboriginal title).
142. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. at 353. The principle that only Congress is
empowered to extinguish aboriginal title applies to all states, including the original thirteen. Thus,
although the original thirteen states each individually succeeded King George III as sovereign, only
the United States is empowered, under the Constitution and the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, to
extinguish aboriginal title. Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. South Rhode Island Land Dev. Corp.,
418 F. Supp. 798, 803-04 (D.R.I. 1976). This principle will apply even though the tribe has been left
almost exclusively in the care of the state. Id. at 804.
143. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
144. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551 (1832). See supra notes 50-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of Worcester.
145. Id. at 547. In Worcester ChiefJustice Marshall stated that Anglo-American history showed
that "Itihe king purchased [Indian] lands when they were willing to sell, at a price they were willing
to take; but never coerced a surrender of them." Id. The ChiefJustice also stated that the sovereign
never interfered with the Indian's self government. Id.
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surrenders. 146 In another case 4 7 the Court stated that because the
Indians' right of occupancy is sacred it cannot be taken from him
except with his consent, and then only upon an agreed
consideration. 
48
The early cases uniformly held that the method of
extinguishment chosen by Congress could not be questioned
because it constituted a sovereign political judgment and that any
compensation or consideration must be made by Congress. 1
49
A. FIFTH AMENDMENT RAMIFICATIONS
The first question concerning the validity of an
uncompensated taking of aboriginal lands was presented in United
States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks .150 Substantial confusion resulted in
this case by the way the Supreme Court stated the issue. The Court
framed the issue as "whether the Indians have a cause of action for
compensation arising out of an involuntary taking of lands held by
original Indian title?' 5' More confusion arose because the Court
failed to state plainly on what grounds it intended to rest its
decision. Some of the language suggested a much broader holding
than the Court intended. In a plurality opinion, Chief Justice
Vinson stated that the taking of lands held by aboriginal title
without compensation did "not satisfy the 'high standards for fair
dealing' required of the United States in controlling Indian
affairs. 152 The Chief Justice also rejected a claim that a
jurisdictional act of 1935't 5  entitled the Indians to compensation
only if the tribe had been formally recognized by Congress as
holding aboriginal title to the lands in question. 54 Accordingly, the
146. "d. Even-thoug-ChiefJustice Marshall stated that the sovereign did not coerc surrenders
of aboriginal lands in Worcester, such forced surrenders were not unheard of. See United States v.
Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976) (United States took
possession after decisively defeating Pit River Indians at Battle of Infernal Caverns).
147. Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373 (1902).
148. Id. at 389 (lands reserved to Indians but subsequently abandoned did not pass to the state
to support public schools in the absence of a specific federal provision).
149. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941);Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823). InJohnson v. M'Intosh the Court stated that the sovereign's power to
extinguish aboriginal title was necessarily absolute. Id. at 588.
150. 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
151. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 47 (1946). The "compensation
arising out of an involuntary taking" language in Tillamooks appears to suggest a fifth amendment
taking. A majority of the Supreme Court, however, has never accepted this proposition. Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States. 348 U.S. 272, 281 (1955).
152. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U .S. at 49 (quoting United States v. Santa
Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 356 (1941)).
153. Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 686. 49 Stat. 801 (1935). This Act allowed the Court ofClaims to
hear claims of uncomlensated takings of aboriginal lands held by certain named Indian groups living
in what was once the Oregon Territory. See id. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S.
*at 41-42.
154. Alcea Band of. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. at 50. The dissenters in Tillarnooks argued that an Indian
residing on unrecognized land could be termed a "squatter" and could not assert a claim against the
NOTE
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Court recognized the Tillamook claim for compensation for lands
taken without their consent. 1
55
The Tillamooks decision created a serious question whether
aboriginal possession entitled Indian tribes to compensation under
the fifth amendment for lands previously taken without
compensation. The United States Supreme Court clarified this
issue in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks JI. 156 In Tillamooks II
the Court stated that nothing in Tillamooks should be interpreted as
saying that a compensable fifth amendment taking existed. 157 In
Tillamooks the compensation rested solely on the jurisdictional
statute designed to address the inequities in the treatment of the
Tillamook Indians when compared to surrounding tribes in the
same geographic area. 1
58
The issue of compensation for an uncompensated taking of
aboriginal title lands was again presented to the Supreme Court in
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States. 159 The Tee-Hit-Ton claim rested
solely on the fifth amendment and differed from the Tillamooks cases
because no statutory directive for the compensation they claimed
existed. 160  The Tee-Hit-Ton claim involved compensation for
timber removed by the United States from lands allegedly in
aboriginal possession. 16' The Tee-Hit-Ton Court noted that
aboriginal title is not considered a property right. 162 Instead,
aboriginal title amounted to an occupational right granted by the
sovereign and protected by the sovereign from intrusion by third
parties. 163 This right of occupancy was susceptible to termination
by the sovereign without any legally enforceable obligation to
compensate the Indians. 164 This decision is in accord with Johnson v.
government when it took possession of the land. Id. at 58 (Reed, Burton, Rutledge, J. J.,
dissenting.). The dissenters argued that since 49 Stat. 801 only allowed compensation when there
were rights "arising under or growing out of aboriginal title," the Tillamook Indians, being mere
squatters, could not recover. Id. at 63-64.
155. Id. at 54.
156. 341 U.S. 48 (1951). The United States Supreme Court heard Tillamooks II to determine
whether the Court of Claims erred when it allowed the natives to recover interest on their claims.
United States v. Alcea Band ofTillamooks II 341 U.S. 48, 49 (1951). Interest would be due only if
the Court determined there was a fifth amendment taking. Id.
157. Id. The Court stated, '"Looking to the former opinions in this case, we tind that none of
them expressed the view that recovery was grounded on a taking under the Fifth Amendment." Id.
158. Id. These inequities were the result of Congress' failure to ratify treaties entered into by the
President's agent. Tillamooks 329 U.S. at 43-44.
159. 348 U.S. 272, 273 (1955). In Tee-Hit-Ton the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians of Alaska brought suit
for compensation from the United States for the removal of timber from tribal lands. Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 273 (1955). The Indians based their claim on the fifth
amendment because Congress had taken no legislative steps to allow compensation for this type of
claim. Id. at 273-74.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 275.





M'Intosh, which stated that the sovereign had authority to
extinguish aboriginal title by purchase or conquest. 165 The Tee-Hit-
Ton Court was unable to find that the extinguishment of aboriginal
title without compensation constituted a fifth amendment taking. 166
The Court stated that any court which previously had allowed the
Indians a recovery granted the compensation "as a matter of grace,
not because of legal liability. ' 167 The Court concluded by saying
that its decision was not intended to promote harshness; instead
the decision left Congress with the power to establish Indian
gratuities to compensate for a taking of aboriginal title lands rather
than creating a constitutional principle. 
168
B. RECOGNIZED LANDS
When a patent or treaty recognizes an Indian tribe's
aboriginal lands a different situation arises. In these situations, if
the land is appropriated without compensation a fifth amendment
violation is established that is compensable with interest. 
169
In a dissenting opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton, Justice Douglas
claimed that the First Organic Act for Alaska, 170 which provided
that the Indians could not be disturbed in possession of lands
165. SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.), 543, 587 (1823). The right to extinguish
aboriginal title was based on the doctrine of discovery. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the doctrine of discovery.
In Tee-Hit-Ton the Court stated that the theory of discovery and conquest gave the conqueror
sovereignty and ownership over aboriginal lands. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 279. This
ownership was subject to a permissive Indian right of occupancy. Id.
166. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 281. Explaining why no Supreme Court case had ever held that a
taking of aboriginal lands by Congress required compensation, the Court in Tee-Hit- Ton stated:
The American people have compassion for the descendants of those Indians who
were deprived of their homes and hunting grounds by the drive of civilization. They
seek to have the Indians share the benefits of our society as citizens of this Nation.
Generous provision has been willingly made to allow tribes to recover for wrongs, as a
matter of grace, not because of legal liability.
Id. at 281-82.
167. Id. at 282. A court cannot exercise the power of compensation as a matter of grace. Id. at
282-83. Such an act of grace is an exercise of sovereign power and must be authorized by Congress.
Id.
168. Id. at 291. The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton implied that ajudicial recognition of a constitutional
right to compensation for aboriginal title would create problems. Id. at 290. The Court expressed the
opinion that "no other course would meet the problem of the growth of the United States except to
make congressional contributions for Indian lands rather than to subject the Government to an
obligation to pay the value when taken with interest to the date of payment." Id.
169. Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 496-97 (1937). Shoshone involved
a dispute between the United States and the Shoshone Tribe over the Wind River Reservation in
Wyoming. Id. at 484. The reservation was created by a treaty of July 3. 1868. Id. at 485. The
Shoshone successfully claimed that the United States wrongfully took one-half of the Indian interest
when the government later placed the Arapahoe Indians on the Wind River Reservation. Id. at 486-
92. The Court awarded damages plus interest from the date of the taking. Id. at 492.
170. 23 Stat. 24 (1884). The relevant portion of the Act provided that "the Indians or other
persons in said district shall not be disturbed in the possession of an,' lands actually in their use or
occupation or now claimed by them but the terms under which such persons may acquire title to such
lands is reserved for future legislation by Congress." Id. at 26.
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actually used, occupied, or claimed by them, had the effect of
recognizing Indian title in a manner similar to a treaty.17' The
majority rejected this argument because virtually all Indian lands
had at some point been recognized by similar language. 172 The
majority stated that to assert that this language is equivalent to a
treaty reservation would ignore the clear rules of law established by
virtually all the previous cases. 173 Aboriginal title that is not
recognized by patent or treaty is only a possessory right that may be
withdrawn by Congress at any time without creating a claim for
compensation. 1
74
VI. SUMMARY OF ABORIGINAL TITLE IN THE UNITED
STATES
Aboriginal title is a right that arises solely from the Indians'
status as the original inhabitants of the land. The natives have a
right to use and occupy their aboriginal lands unless their title is
extinguished by an act of the sovereign, which retains full legal
title. The philosophical basis for this hybrid interest is the
European doctrine of discovery. As a practical matter, the law of
aboriginal title has been greatly influenced by the history of the
long and troubled relationship between the natives and the
conquering Europeans.
The natives' right to hold the land is terminable by the
sovereign at will. No compensation is required unless a right of
compensation arises from an express promise by the sovereign.
Aboriginal title is communal and not personal.17 5 This title is not
alienable to anyone except the sovereign. Aboriginal title is a right
of possession that is valid and sacred against all except the
sovereign who, through grace alone, allows the natives to retain
possession of the land.
VII. ABORIGINAL TITLE IN CANADA
The bounds of aboriginal rights are less firmly established in
171. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 294 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 277-79. The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton determined that a close reading of the First
Organic Act for Alaska revealed that the purpose of the language in question was to preserve the
status quo concerning Alaskan natives. Id. at 278.
173. Id. at 277-79.
174, Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 139, 147 (Ct. Cl.
1967).
175. Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 227 (1923). Although aboriginal possession is
communal, an individual Indian who separates himself from the tribal community and settles on
unclaimed land has perfect title to those lands, even when it is not authorized by the government. See
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1984] NOTE
Canada and therefore are more susceptible to debate than in the
United States. A leading Indian law scholar in Canada has stated
that the lack of case law on the subject of Indian title has left
practically no judicial opinion concerning the nature and character
of aboriginal title in Canada. 176 There is, however, a similarity in
both the content and nature of aboriginal title between the United
States and Canada because of the common legal and historical
experience of the two nations. 1
77
The central characteristics of aboriginal title - limited
alienability and susceptibility to extinguishment without consent -
are embodied in the legal principles of both countries primarily
because these characteristics logically follow the European doctrine
of discovery. 1 78  In both countries Indians were deemed to be
"discovered" peoples whose claim to full title of the land based
upon hunting or fishing could not be recognized.1 79 Recognition of
full title was impossible because neither use demonstrated
possession exclusive enough to establish full fee title to the land. 80
Nonetheless, the aboriginal peoples held a cognizable interest in the
lands with a legal and moral claim to retain possession of the land
and use it according to their own discretion. 18' Thus, both the
United States and Canada embraced the principles arising from the
doctrine of discovery. These principles provide the foundation for
the nature and incidents of aboriginal possession.
id. at 226-29. In Cramer the individual had a type of common law homestead right that did not owe its
existence to any statutory authorization. See id. at 227. Any subsequent grant or patent to another
was in the nature ofa compensable taking. Id. at 233, 236.
176. Mickenberg, Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United States, 9 OSCOODE HALL L.J. 119, 150
(1970).
177. Id. at 120-21. The commentator suggests that several factors are involved in the common
experience of Canada and the United States. Id. at 120. First, the histories of Canada and the United
States were entwined during the period when the doctrine of aboriginal rights developed. Id. Second,
the pattern of dealing with the natives was similar in both countries. Id. Finally, Canadian courts
have frequently referred to American decisions in cases concerning aboriginal rights. Id. at 120-21.
178. Note, Aboriginal Rights: Definition or Denial, 6 QUEEN's L.J. 568, 570 (1980). See supra notes
20-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of the doctrine of discovery.
179. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 569-70 (1823). Chief.Justice Marshall's
theory in M'Intosh was that the manner in which the Indians used the land did not create an interest
in fee simple because the use was not exclusive enough. See id.
180. Id. In describing the nature of Indian title based on fishing and hunting the Court in
M'Intosh stated that:
The measure of property acquired by occupancy is determined, according to the law of
nature, by the extent of men's wants, and their capacity of using it to supply them. It
is a violation of the rights of others to exclude them from the use of what we do not
want, and they have occasion for. Upon this principle the North American Indians
could have acquired no proprietary interest in the vast tracts of territory which they
wandered over; and their rights to their lands on which they hunted, could not be
considered as superior to that which is acquired to the sea by fishing in it. The use in
one case, as well as the other, is not exclusive.
Id.
181. Mickenberg, supra note 176, at 123-24. The theory that a native has a right to use
aboriginal lands in a discretionary manner recognizes the nearly absolute right of the Indians to use
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A. SAINT CATHERINE'S MILLING & LUMBER CO. V. THE QUEEN
Just as Johnson v. M'Intosh'82 provides the foundation of
aboriginal title in the United States, a discussion of aboriginal title
in Canada may begin with the decision of Saint Catherine's Milling
& Lumber Co. v. The Queen. 183 In Saint Catherine's Milling & Lumber
a dispute arose from the surrender of lands situated in Ontario
under an 1873 treaty. 18 4 On appeal the Privy Council addressed the
question of "whether certain lands admittedly situated within the
boundaries of Ontario belonged to that province or the Dominion
of Canada. ' 185 The council ultimately resolved the question in
favor of Ontario' 86 because of section 109 of the British North
America Act of 1867.187
The portion of the decision most significant to this discussion
is found in the sections of the opinion in which the Council
addressed the nature of aboriginal title. In the portions of the
opinion dealing with aboriginal title, the Council based its opinion
on the effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1763.188 Lord Watson,
speaking for the Privy Council, expressed that aboriginal
possessory rights were found in the general provisions of the Royal
Proclamation. 189 These provisions operated in favor of all native
the land in any manner consistent with tribal custom. United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591,
593 (1873). In Cook the Court stated that the Indians could use the land in any reasonable manner.
The tribe, however, could be liable for any bad faith waste. Id.
182. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
183. 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C. 1888).
184. Saint Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 14 App. Cas. 46, 51-52 (P.C.
1888).
185 Id. at 47. The Privy Council was the court of last resort for certain Canadian cases at the
time Saint Catherine's Milling & Lumber was decided. HoGc, CONSTITUT'ONAi. LAW OF CANADA 128
(1977).
186. Saint Catherine's Milling &Lumber, 14 App. Cas. at 52.
187. British North America Act of 1867, CAN. REV. STAT. app. 2 (1970). The relevant part of
S 109 provides, "All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces of
Canada . ... at the Union . . . shall belong to the several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia,
and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise, subject to any Trusts existing in respect
thereof .. " Id.
The Privy Council interpreted this language as having the plain intent of vesting the Crown's
interest with the province where the land was located. Saint Catherine's Milling & Lumber, 14 App.
Cas. at 57-58.
I tn. 14 App.Cas. aft 53-55. The Royal Proclamation provides mat:
[N]o private [pjerson do presume to make any purchase from said Indians of any
[l]ands reserved to said Indians, within those parts of our [c]olonies where, We have
thought proper to allow [slettlement; but that, if at any Itlime any of the [slaid Indians
should be inclined to dispose of the said [lands, the same shall be [p]urchased only for
Us, in our Name, at some public [mleeting or [a]ssembly of said Indians to be held for
the [plurpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our [c]olony respectively
within which they shall lie ....
The Royal Proclamation of 1763, CAN. REV. STT. app. 1 (1970).
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was a fundamental basis for the decision in Johnson v. M'Intosh.
See supra notes 8-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of Johnson v. M'Intosh.
189. 14 App. Cas. at 54-55.
NOTE
groups -then living under the sovereignty and protection of the
British Crown. 190 Lord Watson described the tenure of the Indians
as a '"personal and usufructuary right, dependent upon the
goodwill of the Sovereign."1 91 The interest held by the Crown was
the "substantial and paramount estate, underlying the Indian title,
which became a plenum dominium whenever that title was
surrendered or otherwise extinguished." 19
2
This description of aboriginal title was in accord with what the
Canadian Supreme Court stated when it heard the case earlier. In
the Supreme Court's opinion Justice Strong, dissenting, described
the aboriginal interest as one that:
[M]ay be summarily stated as consisting in the
recognition by the Crown of a usufructuary title in the
Indians to all unsurrendered lands. This title, though not
perhaps susceptible of any accurate legal definition in
exact legal terms, was one which nevertheless sufficed to
protect the Indians in the absolute use and enjoyment of
their lands, whilst at the same time they were
incapacitated from making any valid alienation otherwise
than to the Crown itself, in whom the ultimate title was
... vested.1
93
Justice Strong cited Johnson v. M'Intosh as authority for his
descriptions of the nature of aboriginal title. 194 This is a strong
indication that the substance of aboriginal title in both the United
States and Canada is the same. 195 If Saint Catherine's is analyzed and
compared to Johnson v. M'Intosh and its progeny, it is relatively clear
that both courts are embarked upon a similar path concerning the
essential incidents of aboriginal title.
190. Id. at 54.
191. Id. A usufruct is a right recognized in the civil law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (5th ed.
1979). In nature, it is the right to use and enjoy property vested in another. Id. This includes the
right to take fruits and profits from the property provided that the substance of the property remains
unchanged. Id.
.12. 14 App. Cas. at 55. In the civil law a plenum dominium is full ownership. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1039 (5th ed. 1979). This full ownership exists when both legal ownership and a-
usufructuary interest reside in one party. Id.
193. Saint Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 13 S.C.R. 577, 608 (Can. 1887)
(Strong, J., dissenting), aff'd. 14 App. Cas. 47 (P.C. 1888). Even though Justice Strong dissented
from the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court, his views of the nature of aboriginal title are
consistent with those of the Privy Council. Mickenberg, Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United
States, 9 OSGOOo HALL L.J. 119, 1-45 (1970)._
194. Saint Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 13 S.C.R. 577, 610 (Can. 1887)
(Strong, J., dissenting).
195. P. CUMMING & N. MICKENBERO, supra note 1, at 33. That both Lord Watson and Justice
Strong adopted civil law language to describe the nature of aboriginal title is of no great importance.
Id. It is apparent, when the nature of aboriginal title in both countries is examined, that both the
American and Canadian courts view the incidents of aboriginal title similarly. Id.
1984]
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B. CALDER v. ATTORNEY GENERAL
After Saint Catherine's, more than eighty years passed before the
Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue of the substantive
nature of aboriginal title. This issue was again presented in Calder v.
Attorney General.196  The Calder decision created substantial
ambiguity because a deeply divided court was unable to reach a
consensus. 197
In Calder the appellants, officers of the Nishga Indian Tribal
Council, brought an action against the Attorney General of British
Columbia seeking a declaration that the tribe's aboriginal title had
never been relinquished or extinguished. 198 The lands constituted
roughly one thousand square miles that had been occupied by the
Nishga since time immemorial. 199 The government did not contend
that the Indian tribe had surrendered its claim by treaty or
otherwise, nor did the government contend that aboriginal title had
been expressly extinguished.200 Rather, the government based its
claim on the theory that nine proclamations by the Royal Governor
of British Columbia and four ordinances passed by the Governor-
in-Council constituted an implied extinguishment.2 1  The
Provincial Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the
proclamations and ordinances had the effect of extinguishing
aboriginal title. 202 The Provincial Court also found that because
196. 34 D.L.R.3d 145 (Can. 1973).
197. Note, supra note 178, at 584. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau has been quoted as
saying to the Indian chiefs of British Columbia that perhaps "you have more legal rights than we
thought you had." Id. This statement was made shortly after the Calder decision. Id.
198. Calder v. Attorney General, 34 D.LR.3d 145, 148 (Can. 1973).
199. Id. at 148-49.
200. Id. at 149.
201. Id. at 158-59.
202. Calder v. Attorney General, 8 D.L.R.3d 59, 82 (Sup. Ct. B.C. 1969). The Proclamation
of December 2, 1858, issued by Governor Douglas, declared that all Crown lands in British
Columbia could be sold and granted by the governor. Id. at 75. The Proclamation of February 14,
1859, declared that all lands in British Columbia and all mines and minerals thereunder belonged to
the Crown in fee. Id. It also provided for the surveying of Crown lands. Id. The Proclamation of
.January 4, 1860, provided that all British subjects and aliens who took an oath of allegiance could
acquire unoccupied, unreserved and unsurveyed lands and that their rights would be recognized
after completion of a survey. Id. at 76. The Proclamation ofJanuary 20, 1860, provided for the sale
of certain lands by private contract and authorized certain officials to make the sales at certain prices.
Id. at 277. The Proclamation ofJanuary 19, 1861, provided further details of land sales. A second
Proclamation ofJanuary 19, 1861, reduced the price of land. Id. The Proclamation of May 28, 1861,
dealt with conditions of preemption and limited the right to 160 acres. The Proclamation of August
27, 1861, established mining districts. Id. at 77-78. The Ordinance ofApril 11, 1865, reaffirms much
of what was contained in the proclamations. Id. at 79. It reserved all gold and silver mines on
subsequent sales. Id. It also provided for a new price for lands sold at public sales. Id. The Ordinance
of March 31, 1866, restricted the right of preemption. Id. at 80. Indians from either British
Columbia or the surrounding territories could not exercise preemptive rights without the permission
of the governor. Id. The Ordinance of March 10, 1869, dealt with the payment of purchase prices for
preemption claims. Id. The Ordinance of June 1, 1870, amended, reenacted and consolidated the
laws covering Crown lands in British Columbia. Id. at 81. Perhaps the most intriguing of these acts is
the Ordinance of March 31, 1866. The Court of Appeals for British Columbia accepted the
proposition that these acts, when taken as whole, indicate an intent by the sovereign to extinguish
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aboriginal title had been extinguished, the courts could not
examine sovereign acts that were, in essence, political questions.
20 3
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision. Three
justices determined that aboriginal title was extinguished, three
justices held that it was not extinguished, and three justices would
have dismissed the appeal because the tribe lacked a fiat to sue the
government. 20 4  Thus, the justices who addressed the issue of
whether there was sufficient conduct to establish an extinguishment
of aboriginal title split and no majority opinion of the court
resulted.
205
Justice Judson delivered the opinion which held that
aboriginal title had been extinguished. 2 6 He acknowledged that the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 did not establish aboriginal title
because the lands in question came into British possession after
1763.207 He disagreed, however, with the Attorney General's claim
that aboriginal title was dependent upon the Royal
Proclamation. 20 8  Instead, Justice Judson recognized that the
origins of aboriginal title could be found in a continuing policy of
the Crown to respect the aborigines' right to possess and occupy
their ancestral lands. 20 9 Justice Judson relied on both Saint
Catherine's and American case law to arrive at the conclusion that
aboriginal title was a possessory interest that could only be
extinguished by the sovereign. 210 Justice Judson stated that the
right of the sovereign to terminate the aboriginal interest was
absolute, did not require compensation, and the method of
termination was a nonjusticiable political act by the sovereign.
211
aboriginal title. Calder v. Attorney General, 13 "D.L.R.3d 64, 94-95 (C.A.B.C. 1970). If this
proposition is accepted and the March 31 ordinance is given its full effect, apparently it would be
virtually impossible for the Indians to own anything unless they received permission from the
governor to exercise preemptive rights. Calderv. Attorney General, 34 D.L.R.3d 145, 214-17 (Can.
1973) (Hall, J., dissenting). This presents the novel position that the Indians could not hold their
land by aboriginal title or preemption. Id. at 217. Thus, the Indians are left in the position of mere
trespassors with no cognizable interest in their aboriginal homelands. Id.
203. Calder v. Attorney General, 8 D.L.R.3d at 72. In arriving at this conclusion the court
relied on Tee-Hit-Ton Indianssv. United States. Id. at 71-72.
204. Calder v. Attorney General, 34 D.L.R.3d 145, 145-48 (Can. 1973).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 145-46.
207. Id. at 153-54.
208. Id. at 152-56. Justice Judson determined that aboriginal title arises from i way of life and
the Crown's acquiescence to the native's carrying on that traditional life style. Id.
209. Seeid. at 156.
210. Id. at 150-53.
211. See id. at 160-61. In CalderJustice Judson quoted extensively front United States c. Santa Fe
Pac. R. R. As further authority for the court's decision, Justice Judson relied on a Privy Council
appeal from Rhodesia. In deciding In re Southern Rhodesia, 1919 A.C. 211 (Rhodesia), the Privy
Counsel held that the Crown holds aboriginal lands in fee title and is empowered to establish
procedures for white entry and settlement on aboriginal lands. See In re Southern Rhodesia, 1919
A.C. 211, 234 (Rhodesia).
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Justice Judson found that the proclamations and ordinances
issued by Governor James Douglas prior to the time British
Columbia entered into the Dominion extinguished aboriginal
title. 212 These legislative acts generally provided that the title of all
lands not otherwise appropriated belonged to the Crown in fee. 213
Justice Judson found that these acts revealed a unity of intention by
the Crown to exercise absolute sovereignty over the territory.
214
This exercise of sovereignty was inconsistent with any claim of
interest by aboriginal possession. 215 As further evidence of this
intent he noted that the Act of Union 21 6 recognized a railroad belt
between British Columbia and the Dominion. 2 7 Justice Judson
found that this was inconsistent with the existence of aboriginal
title. 218  Because Justice Judson found that the sovereign
extinguished aboriginal title, any question concerning the manner
212. Calder v. Attorney General, 34 D.L.R.3d 145, 159-60 (Can. 1973).
213. Id. at 158.
214. Id. at 159-61.
215. Id. A debatable point is whether or not an American court could find that the acts involved
extinguished aboriginal title. Rather, it appears likely that an American court would view the
legislative acts considered in Calder as necessary to the administration of government and without a
sufficient intent to affect aboriginal title. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339
(1941).
216. The Imperial Order in Council of May 16, 1871, CAN. REV. STAT. app. 10 (1970). The
relevant section of the Order, Term 11, reads:
The Government of the Dominion undertake to secure the commencement
simultaneously, within two years from the date of the Union, of the construction of a
railway from the Pacific towards the Rocky Mountains, and from such point as may be
selected, east of the Rocky Mountains, towards the Pacific, to connect the seaboard of
British Columbia with the railway system of Canada; and further, to secure the
completion of such railway within ten years from the date of the Union.
And the Government of British Columbia agrees to convey to the Dominion
Government, in trust, to be appropriated in such manner as the Dominion
Government may deem advisable in furtherance of the construction of the said
railway, a similar extent of public lands along the line of railway throughout its entire
length in British Columbia, not to exceed, however, twenty (20) miles on each side of
said line, as may be appropriated for the same purpose by the Dominion Government
from the public lands in the northwest territories and the Province of Manitoba.
Provided that the quantity of land which may be held under preemption right or by
Crown grant within the limits of the tract of land in British Columbia to be so
conveyed to the Dominion Government shall be made good to the Dominion from
contiguous public lands; and provided further, that until the commencement, within
two years, as aforesaid, from the date of the union, of the construction of the said
railway, the Government of British Columbia shall not sell or alienate any further
portions of the public lands of British Columbia in any other way than under right of
pre-emption, requiring actual residence of the preemptor on the land claimed by him.
In consideration of the land to be so conveyed in aid of the construction of the said
railway, the Dominion Government agree to pay to British Columbia from the date of
the Union, the sum of 100,000 dollars per annum, in half-yearly payments in advance.
Id.
217. Calder, 34 D.L.R.3d at 162-163.
218. Id. Contra United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1941) (a railroad
cannot assert full fee title to aboriginal lands in a land grant unless the United States has taken steps
establishing a clear intent to extinguish aboriginal title); Buttz v. Northern Pac. R.R., 110 U.S. 55,
67 (1886) (a grant of land to a railroad is taken by railroad subject to Indian right of use and
occupancy).
NOTE
of extinguishment was clearly nonjusticiable. 219
Justice Hall, dissenting, recognized that aboriginal title was an
equitable interest that was terminable at the sovereign's
command. 220 Justice Hall asserted that once aboriginal title had
been established, a presumption in favor of continued aboriginal
title existed until the contrary was proven. 22 1 In Justice Hall's
opinion the issue was whether the legislative acts were sufficient to
overcome the presumption that aboriginal title continued to reside
in the Nishga. 222 Justice Hall argued that the nature of aboriginal
title was such that once the Nishga came under British sovereignty,
Indian title could be extinguished only by surrender to the Crown
or by specific legislation enacted by competent legislative
authority. 223 Further, Justice Hall argued that the existence of.
aboriginal title presented an issue of fact.
224
Justice Hall believed that the facts and circumstances
surrounding Governor Douglas' acts did not extinguish original
title. 225 Justice Hall based his conclusion on a number of factors. 226
First, he argued that the phrasing of the various acts did nothing
more than assert that the fee interest in all lands and minerals in
British Columbia resided in the Crown. 227 InJustice Hall's opinion
this constituted nothing more than a restatement of the common
law position. Justice Hall argued that the use of these acts to
enlarge government claims at the expense of the Indians was
manifestly improper. 228
Second, Justice Hall believed that Governor Douglas was not
empowered by his letters of authority to extinguish aboriginal title
without compensating the various Indian tribes. 229 Furthermore,
219. Calder, 34 D.L.R.3d at 160-61.
220. Id. at 174 (Hall,J., dissenting). Justice Hall stated that the Nishga had made no claim to be
able to sell or alienate their right to possession except to the Crown. Id. Instead, the Nishga agreed
that the Crown had plenary authority to dispossess them. The Nishga, however, claimed that the
sovereign had never acted in a manner sufficient to dispossess them. Id.
221. Id. at 208. But cf. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941) (an
extinguishment is not to be lightly implied because of the guardian-ward relationship between
sovereign and native tribe).
222. Calder, 34 D.L.R.3d at 174 (Hall, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 208.
224. Id. at 174-75. Justice Hall relied on a Nigerian appeal to the Privy Council in which Lord
Haldane cautioned against the tendency to recognize only those titles that had a counterpart in the
common law. The mere fact, however, that the lifestyle was foreign to the common law could not
defeat the beneficial interest possessed by the natives. Id. See Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern
Nigeria, [1921] 2 A.C. 399, 402-04 (Nig.). See also United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S.
339, 345 (1941) (occupancy requirement necessary to establish aboriginal title is a question of fact).
225. Calder, 34 D.L.R.3d at 216 (HallJ., dissenting).
226. Id. at 214-23.
227. Id. at 214-16. The Nishga Indians never claimed that they had fee title; rather, they
claimed a usufructuary interest. Id. at 174. They argued that while the Crown did have power to
dispossess them, it had never asserted its right to do so. Id.
228. Seeid. at 214-16, 223.
229. Id. at 217.
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Justice Hall argued that even if the power to extinguish aboriginal
title was implied in the Governor's office, the acts in question were
legally insufficient to constitute an extinguishment. 230  Finally,
Justice Hall stated that the Nishga's continued use and possession
of their aboriginal lands in a traditional manner was sufficient
proof that aboriginal title had not been extinguished in British
Columbia.
231
The significance of the Calder decision in American law is that
the Canadian Supreme Court was willing to find an extinguish-
ment when the circumstances indicated that such a result in an
American court would be unlikely. in Choate v. Trapp232 the United
States Supreme Court stated that doubtful expressions of
extinguishment are to be resolved in favor of continued aboriginal
possession. 233 This appears to be a statement that supports Justice
Hall's claim that there exists a presumption of continued aboriginal
title.
In United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad34 the United States
Supreme Court declared that the intent to extinguish aboriginal
title must be plain and clear. 235 In Sante Fe Pacific Railroad
aboriginal title continued even though the government established
a reservation and the United States granted some of the land held
by aboriginal title to the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad.2 36 An American
court could find that the existence of a railroad right of way or the
allowing of preemption under certain circumstances would not
affect Indian title. In these instances the parties received only the
United States' interest in the fee title. It is probable that an
American court faced with a situation similar to Calder would rely
heavily on the analogous facts in Choate v. Trapp and United States v.
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad to arrive at a conclusion similar to Justice
Hall's dissent.
Even though Justice Hall's result is likely in an American
court, Justice Judson's opinion does produce some novel
arguments and interpretations. These arguments and
230. Id. Justice Hall noted that Governor Douglas was instructed to put certain conditions in all
cessions from the natives. Id. Justice Hall questioned how the government could demand concessions
in cessions from the Indians and yet claim that aboriginal title had been extinguished, leaving the
Indians nothing to cede. Id.
231. Id. at 173-90. In Justice Hall's view the facts of Calder clearly established that the Nishga
had used and occupied the lands in question from time immemorial. Id. at 190. This was sufficient
evidence of aboriginal title if no clear act of extinguishment had occurred. Id.
232. 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
233. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
234. 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
235. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941). The requirement that the
sovereign's intent to extinguish aboriginal title be clear is based on the sovereign's guardian
relationship with its Indian wards. Id.
236. Id. at 343-45, 351-53.
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interpretations may be of value to an American court in a situation
in which the facts indicate that aboriginal title continues but there
are some equities favoring extinguishment. It would seem,
however, that an American court faced with a problem similar to
Calder would be unwilling to find an extinguishment.
C. POST-CALDER DECISIONS
The lack of a consensus in Calder created continuing problems
with aboriginal title in Canada. The problem is particularly acute
in British Columbia. In a case dealing with the taking of a moose
out of season, a court held that aboriginal title had never been
extinguished in British Columbia. 237 In a case dealing with the
taking of a fish contrary to federal law, a court held aboriginal title
had been extinguished in British Columbia. 238 On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for British Columbia the conviction for taking a
fish out of season was upheld because the federal government was
empowered to enact legislation even if aboriginal title still
existed. 239 The Supreme Court affirmed without ever addressing
the issue of aboriginal title. 240 Thus, the debate over the effect of
Governor Douglas' acts on aboriginal title remains a live issue.
In a recent case dealing with the aboriginal rights of the Inuit,
Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern
Development,24 1 a Canadian federal trial court upheld the exclusive
right of occupancy of the natives. 242 The case did not present a
237. Regina v. Dennis, 56 D.L.R.3d 379 (Prov. Trial Ct. B.C. 1974). In Dennis two defendants
were convicted of taking a moose out of season without a permit. Id. at 380-81. The trial judg"! based
his finding that aboriginal title still existed uponjustice Hall's dissent in Calder. Id. at 384-88.
238. Regina v. Derriksan, 52 D.L.R.3d 744 (Sup. Ct. B.C. 1974), aff'd, 60 D.L.R.3d 140
(C.A.B.C. 1975), aff'd, 71 D.L.R.3d 159 (Can. 1976). In Derriksan a native was convicted of taking a
fish out of season. Id. The court found that Derriksan had no aboriginal right to fish for his own
subsistence. Id. at 754. This decision was based on the principle of stare decisis. Id. at 753. The court
reasoned that since Calder did not result in a majority decision, the lower court ruling that aboriginal
title had been extinguished must be followed. Id.
239. Regina v. Derriksan, 60 D.L.R.3d 140 (C.A.B.C. 1975), aff'd, 71 D.L.R.3d 159 (Can.
1976).
240. Regina v. Derricksan, 71 D.L.R.3d 159 (Can. 1976).
241. 107 D.L.R.3d 513 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div. Can. 1979).
242. Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs & N. Dev., 107 D.L.R.3d 513 (Fed.
Ct. Trial Div. Can. 1979). The plaintiffs in this case were Inuit who lived, hunted, and fished in the
Baker Lake area in the Northwest Territories. Id. at 514. The plaintiffs sought the following relief:
(a) an order restraining the government defendants from issuing land permits,
prospecting permits, granting mining leases and recording mining claims which would
allow mining activities in the Baker Lake Area;
(b) an order restraining the defendant mining companies from carrying on such
activities there;
(c) a declaration that the lands comprising the Baker Lake Area are "subject" to
the aboriginal right and title of the Inuit residing in or near that area to hunt or fish
thereon;
(d) a declaration that the lands comprising the Baker Lake Area are neither
"territorial lands" nor "public lands" as defined respectively in the Territorial Lands
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situation in which the acts of the governor or the legislature
ostensibly extinguished aboriginal title; rather, the claim of
extinguishment arose under either a charter granted to the
Hudson's Bay Company on May 2, 1670 or by the Imperial Order
in Council ofJune 23, 1870.243
The facts in Baker Lake are similar to Edwardsen v. Morton24 4 in
that mineral companies were entering aboriginal lands pursuant to
leases issued by the federal government. 24 1 The Inuit people
brought an action for recognition of their aboriginal interest and for
an injunction against the mineral companies as third party
trespassers.
246
The court recognized that although almost all reported cases
concerning original title referred only to "Indians," Eskimos and
Inuit people were also included in the term. 247  Thus, unless
Eskimos or Inuit are excluded from the term "Indians" by either
an express provision or a compelling inference they are considered
Indians.2 48 Therefore, the decisions concerning aboriginal title
applied equally to Indians or Inuit.
249
The court also agreed that although the lands were not
included in the area subject to the Royal Proclamation of 1736, the
government could not rely on this fact to defeat aboriginal title. 250
The court noted that aboriginal title may arise at common law. 2 5 '
Act and the Public Lands Grants Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-29, nor subject to the Canada
Mining Regulations;
(e) a declaration that, until such time as the terms of the Imperial Order in
Council, R.S.C. 1970, App. II, No. 9, which admitted Rupert's Land into Canada
are fulfilled by Canada, Canada lacks legislative jurisdiction to abrogate Inuit
aboriginal rights in the Baker Lake Area;
(f) As an alternative to (e), a declaration that, until such aboriginal rights are
expressly abrogated by Parliament, no one is entitled to deal with the Baker Lake Area
in a manner inconsistent with Inuit aboriginal rights, notwithstanding other statutory
authority;
(g) a declaration that the Inuit resident in the Baker Lake Area have "rights
previously acquired" and are "holders of surface rights" within the meaning of the
mining laws with respect to the Baker Lake Area;
(h) costs.
Id. at 515-16.
243. Id. at 547. See the Imperial Order in Council ofjune 23, 1870, CAN. REv. STAT. App. II,
No. 9 (1970). The Imperial Order in Council ofJune 23, 1870, constitutes part of the Canadian
Constitution whereby Rupert's Land was admitted into the Dominion of Canada. This enactment
was made pursuant to § 146 of the British North America Act of 1867 that allows for the admission of
new territories into Canada. See HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 5, 448 (1977).
244. 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973). See supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Edwardsen v- Morton.
245. Baker Lake, 107 D.L.R.3d at 515.
246. Id. at 515-16. See supra note 242 for a discussion of relief sought by the tribe in Baker Lake.
247. Baker Lake, 107 D.L.R.3d at 540-41.
248. Id. at 541.
249. Id. Judge Mahoney, thejudge in Baker Lake, relied on an earlier case that held that the term
Indian includes Inuit and Eskimo people. See In re Eskimos [ 19391 2 D. L. R. 417 (Can.).
250. -laker Lake, 107D. L. R. 3 dat 541.
251. Id. See Calder- v. Attorney General, 34 D.L.R.3d 145, 148 (Can. 1973) (Judson, J.) (six
.Justices concurred in ruling that aboriginal title arises at common law and is not dependent upon the
Royal Proclamation of 1763).
19841
After the court ruled that aboriginal title could be applied to
the Inuit in the Northwest Territories, it examined the elements
necessary to establish aboriginal title.25 2 The court concluded that
in order to state a claim the Inuit had to prove four essential
elements. 2,53 First, that they and their ancestors were members of an
organized society.25 4 Second, that the organized society occupied
the specific territory in which they asserted aboriginal title. 25
Third, that the occupation was to the exclusion of other organized
societies. 25 6 Finally, that the occupation was an established fact at
the time Great Britian first asserted sovereignty.2 5 7
The Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
argued that the Inuit failed to meet the established criteria on a
number of grounds.2 58 First, the government contended that
because the Baker Lake Inuit consisted of closely related small
bands whose subsistence was derived from trapping, hunting, and
fishing they could not be considered an organized society.2 59 The
court rejected this argument stating that all the Inuit were required
to prove was that they held the claimed rights in a sufficiently
defined manner to permit their recognition by the common law.
260
The court also stated that previous American and Canadian cases
concerning the amount of organization required to establish
aboriginal title were inapplicable to the Baker Lake Inuit. 261 This
was because of the differences in social and political structure
between the Inuit and other tribes.
262
Second, the government contended that the issuance of the
leases represented an act of the sovereign sufficient to extinguish
any claim of aboriginal title. 263 The Baker Lake Inuit contended
that the language of Justice Hall's dissent in Calder was evidence
that aboriginal title could only be extinguished by an express
statement of the sovereign. 264 The court rejected both arguments
by stating that any validly enacted statute that showed a clear intent






258. Seeid. at 513.
259. Id. at 513.
260. Id. at 543.
261. Id. at 544.
262. Id. The social differences between the Inuit and other tribes arose because the Inuit
inhabited the more desolate and barren areas of the Arctic tundra,. Id.
263. Id. at 554. The relevant portion of the Territorial Lands Act of 1950 provided that the
"Governor in Council may authorize the sale, lease or other disposition of territorial lands and may
make regulations authorizing the Minister to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of territorial lands
subject to such limitations and conditions as the Governor in Council may prescribe." Id at 555.
264. Id. at 550.
NOTE
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would suffice; the mere fact, however, that legislation allowed the
Ministry to lease lands for mineral development in the Northwest
Territories was not sufficient to establish an intent to extinguish.
265
The court found that the Baker Lake Inuit had established their
aboriginal title claim.
266
The Baker Lake four part test closely parallels American case
law. 26 7 Perhaps the most significant difference between the
American authorities and Baker Lake arises in the Canadian
requirement that aboriginal possession be an established fact at the
time Great Britan first asserted sovereignty over the area. In Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States268 the Court of
Claims rejected this very argument on the grounds that aboriginal
title and sovereign title are distinct and separate estates, therefore,
either may be created or destroyed without regard to the other.
269
Thus, in the United States it is not necessary to prove that
aboriginal possession was established prior to the time the
sovereign first asserted its status.
Calder and Baker Lake may appear to be incongruous. A closer
examination, however, reveals that the law applied in both cases is
the same. The results differ in some degree, not because of any
difference in the applicable law, but because of a divergent
interpretation of factual matters.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The principle that aboriginal title vests in the native
inhabitants of a discovered land is universally accepted in both the
United States and Canada. That native peoples have the right to
use and occupy the lands they have inhabited from time
immemorial is not susceptible to question in either country. The
natives' right of occupancy and use exists at the will of the
sovereign. The sovereign has plenary power in both the United
States and Canada to extinguish aboriginal title.
265. Id. at 551. Judge Mahoney examined the legislative history of the Territorial Lands Act of
1950, which authorized the leasing of the lands in question. Id. at 554. See CAN. REV. STAT. ch. T-6
(1970) (amended 1979). He concluded by finding that the Act did not contemplate an
extinguishment of aboriginal title because in the course of the debates the Eskimos, Inuit, or Indian
people were never mentioned. 107 D.L.R.3d at 554. He determined that to allow the Act to affect
aboriginal title would be to improperly imply an extinguishment. Id. at 551-55.
266. Id. at 557.
267. See supra notes 64-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements necessary
to establish aboriginal title in America.
268. 490 F.2d 935 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
269. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 941 (Ct. Cl. 1974).




Aboriginal title is a possessory interest. It is communal in
nature and must be asserted within the traditions and customs of
the tribal group. Yet, the interest is considered sacred and is not to
be lightly interfered with. The Indian title is perfect against all but
the sovereign.
The differences between the United States and Canada are not
great in the area of aboriginal title. The common legal and
historical perspective of the two countries regarding aboriginal title
makes this an area where the examination and use of the other
jurisdiction's case law could be extremely useful.
RALPH ERICKSON

